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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
MIKE DRAGOS, and MILKA
DRAGOS, his wife,
Plaint iff s and Respondents,
Case No.
7895

vs.
TEDDY G. RUSSELL and MANILLA RUS.SELL, his wife,
D·efendants a,nd Appellants.

BRIEF OF RES-PONDENTS

ARGUMENT

The original case before this Court was remanded
for the following purpose :
"Additional evidence should be taken to determine what description is necessary to fix the
·boundary between the lots of the parties, so that
the new line correctly coincides with the fence
line which is conclusively shown to be north of
the cabins.
"Th~ problem concerning the location of the
sewer cannot be determined by this Court upon
the record."
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At the further trial the parties made the following
stipulation as to the issues:
"MR. METOS: I think in order to make a
proper record, there should be a stipulation in
the record that all of the previous testimony
that was offered and received, including the exhibits, should be considered as part of the evidence so we can refer to it." (R. 33).
Mr. Livingston, Attorney for Appellants, stated that
the issues to be further determined by the Trial Court
were as follows:
"1. To know where the fence is, the fence
has been removed; where as a matter of legal
description, where the boundary should be fixed
between the parties, and
"2. The location of the sewer, that doesn't
appear in the evidence.
"It seems those are the two problems more
strictly speaking.
"THE COURT: Those are the problems."
(R. 33).
On March 1, 1952 during the hearing of plaintiffs
motion to amend the findings and conclusions of law, it
was stipulated in open court between counsel for the
parties:
"That the boundary 'between the property
of the Plaintiffs and the Defendants be on the
legal boundary line beginning from the corner
point on the sidewalk of State Street and thence
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due ,vest 165 feet." (Line n1ore particularly described, see . Affidavit of Judge Baker).
Unforttmately, the reporter 'vas not present to take
down the stipulation, but a minute order to that effect
was entered by the clerk (R. 74). The main reason for
such stipulation was for the benefit of the defendants in
that, the description now claimed by him gives to the
plaintiffs part of their property for a distance of approximately 30 or 40 feet beginning from the sidewalk on
State Street. Furthermore, the description zig-zagged
to the western end of the boundary line. There is no
testimony or any evidence in the record to the effect that
the fence line zig-zagged. All of the witnesses who testified in the case and were asked the question of whether
or not the line was straight, all stated that the fence
extended straight from State Street to the western
boundary line (R. 165, 174, 182).
The final judgment of the court in which this appeal
is take~ fixes the fence line between the two properties
from east to west so that it veers northerly to the west
end line to the point claimed by the defendant. The
defendants' cabins are all south of the line established by
the court. The sewer line has been removed by the defendants so that no improvement belonging to the defendants is now within or on the property belonging to
the plaintiffs.
We believe that the statements made by the app,ellants in their brief at pages 8 to 10 concerning calculated
interpelation from the tables in the Howard Chapin Ives,
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Natural Trigonometric F'unctions, are conclusions on the
part of the defendants. Whether the figures are correct
or incorrect cannot be ascertained without cross-examining Mr. Ives or defendants' attorneys who wrote the
brief. Further, the calculations appear to be immaterial.
The files in this case were lost. It was necessary
for the purpose of this appeal to make out new papers.
It now app·ears that an exhibit consisting of a map prepared by Art DuPaix is not in the files and exhibits now
before the court. A copy of this exhibit will be offered
at the time of the argument; it shows the boundary line·
that was finally decreed by the court and from which
decree the present appeal has been taken.
The evidence is conclusive that the fence was on the
boundary line for a distance of. 165 feet west from 'State
Street to a telephone pole which is on plaintiff's land.
Edward B. McCabe, a previous owner of defendants'
land testified :

"A. Yes, I remember the pole, but it never meant
anything to me.
"Q. Was that near the fence~
"A. If I remember right it is pretty hard to say,
but I would say it was about twenty inches
north sixteen to twenty inches north.
"Q. How long was that pole line in there, was it
in there the entire time you had the property~

"A. Yes." (R. 197).
"Q.

''A.

The telephone pole was not part of the fence,
was 1•t~.
No." (R. 200).
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Hyrum Hendricks, another \Yitness for the det"l'ndants stated in reference to the telephone pole:

'

"Q. It ":rasn't part of the fence, ""as it'?
''A. No, it would be on the north." {R. 18:2).
These witnesses testified in behalf of the defendants.
CONCLUSION
The defendants have secured for themselves, by
virtue of the judgment appealed from, everything that
they could possibly be entitled to. All of their improvements are south of the boundary line. The boundary
is in a straight line so that future purchasers of these
properties can identify what they are buying. It should
be borne in mind that the fence was torn down by the
defendants so that most of the fence line cannot be ascertained, particularly west from the first telephone pole.
The judgment is supported by ample evidence.
We submit that the judgment and decree of the
court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

H. G. METOS,
Attorney for Plailntiffs
and Respondents.
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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
RENNOLD PENDER,
Plaintiff a;nd Appellant,
vs.
T. C. JAcKSON and RuBY G. JACKSON,
his wife, CHARLES E. DAVEY, and
JANE DoE DAVEY, whose true name
is unknown, RALPH M. DAVEY, and
BETH S. DAVEY, his wife, et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.

Case No. 7,896

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF FACTS

~

This is an action to quiet title in the plaintiffappellant (Rec. 1, 2) to named realty, in simplest form.
As filed, it encompassed numerous defendants and parcels
of land (Rec. 1, 2). Since this phase of the action concerns only the defendants and respondents Charles ~j.
Davey, Jane Doe Davey, Ralph M. Davey, and Beth S.
Davey, and the unknown heirs, executors, administrators,
and assigns, in the parcel of realty described as follows:
Commencing 53 rods North and 181/2 rods
East from the South quarter corner of Section
27, Township 1 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake
Meridian, and running thence East 11 rods;
thence North 15.4 rods, thence West 11 rods ;
thence South 15.4 rods to the place of beginning,
in Salt Lake County, Utah
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(Rec. 1, 2), no further reference to other descriptions
and defendants mentioned in the original complaint will
be made herein. Action was commenced by filing appellant's complaint on September 18th, 1950 (Rec. 3).
The answer and counterclaim of Ralph M. Davey and
Beth S. Davey, his wife (defendants-respondents herein),
claiming as successors to twenty-six twenty-sevenths of
the interest in said property was filed August 3rd, 1951
(Rec. 5-7), and appellant's rep_,ly to counterclaim (Rec.
8) was filed August 31, 1951. Trial of the cause was had
on March 26th and July 2nd, 1952 (Rec. 1, 95), and
decree in favor of the defendants-respondents, Davey,
was entered on July 2nd, 1952 (Rec. 108-110), determining them to own twenty-six twenty-sevenths of the
ground in suit, and directing that the property be sold (as
partition was impracticable) and the sale price (after
allowing for certain adjustments of expenses and cross
items between the parties hereto) be divided twenty-six
twenty-sevenths to respondents and one twenty-seventh
to appellant (Rec. 108-110). From this decree, and denial
of motion for new trial (Rec. 113), plaintiff-appellant
pTosecutes this appeal (Rec. 114).
Plaintiff appellant acquired a tax deed to the realty
in question under date of June 7th, 1939, recorded same
June 29th, 1939 (Rec. 13, 14, Exhibit "A"), paying
therefore $44.33 (Rec. 14, Exhibits "A", "B"), and
appellant paid all taxes on said realty for each of the
years 1940 to and including 1949 (R-ec. 14, 15, 16, Exhibits "C", "D"). It was-stipulated that the county
recorder (or someone from that office) if called, would
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testify as to the truth of the facts shown in the certified copy of the records offered as Exhibit "E "-Tax
Sale Certificate, and it \Yas so received (Rec. 16, Exhibit '"E"). Appellant testified (Rec. 17-19, 45-52), that
he took possession of the ground by going on it in 1939,
and at least once each year, subsequently, straightened
up the ground, kept weeds down, and put up ''For
Rent" signs on the ~p·roperty of the types like Exhibits
'' G'' and '' H' ', and ''No Trespassing'' signs of similar
kind to Exhibit ''F", and replaced the signs when they
were down or removed. Appellant had the property
plowed in 1949 by i\IcEwan W. Voorhees (Rec. 16, 40-41,
53-55). Placing of the signs by appellant during years
1945-1949 and the driving of stakes to support or hold
them, "\vas ·witnessed by Jessie W. Lamont (Rec. 56)
according to stipulation made as to her testimony if
she had been called as a witness. James F. Choules and
vvife, testifying for the respondents stated that they
never saw any such signs, although they lived in the
immediate vicinity (Rec. 57-64), as did William A. Cannon also resident in the neighborhood since about 1946,
(Rec. 64-74). Another of respondent's witnesses, Moroni
Fox (Rec. 74-79) noticed a ''for rent'' sign on the
property about 1948-1949, and respondent Ralph 1\ti.
Davey, removed such a sign (Rec. 80-81) after March
of 1949 from the property. It also appears that respondent Davey knew in 1939 of the issuance of tax deed to
the appellant (Rec. 82, 87, 91), that respondent Davey
paid the 1939 taxes ( Rec. 84, 87, Exhibit '' 4' '), and
the 1950 and 1951 taxes (Rec. 84, Exhibits "5", "12").
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Other than to go by the property and stop every sixty
days or so in the summertime (Rec. 86), except during
the years 1942-1946 (Rec. 93), and to remove several
loads of soil in 1950 from the lot (Rec. 84-86), respondent Davey did nothing with res:pect to the physical
handling of the ground; although, in 1942 he had probate
proceedings instigated in one estate (Rec. 90), and concluded other probates in 1948 (Ree. 92). Until respondent Davey acquired the interest of his various relatives,
claiming as heirs of the original owners, in 1948-1949
(Rec. 91) he claimed only a one-fifteenth interest in the
ground in question. It also appears that appellant filed
an action to quiet title against the same ground as here
involved about 1941 (Rec. 42, 97), but after some sort
of negotiations, (Proposed Exhibits "M", "N") with
some of co-heirs with respondent Davey, whereby it was
p·roposed that the property be sold and proceeds be divided half to appellant and half to other parties, if the
action were dismissed; such dismissal followed in 1945
(Rec. 97), but the agreements were apparently never·formally ·consummated. In 1942, appellant acquired by quitclaim deed an undivided one twenty-seventh interest in
the premises from an heir of one of the original owners
(Exhibit "3 "). It was stipulated that if the county
treasurer were called, he would testify that auditor's
affidavits were not currently attached to the 1934 assessment rolls, pursuant to which year's delinquent tax sale
plaintiff-appellant's tax deed was issued. (Rec. 13, 94.)
Other facts will be detailed in connection with development of the arguments.
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S
ADVERSE POSSESSION.
POINT II
ORDINARY USE OF OCCUPANT MAY COMPREHEND
HOLDING LAND FOR INVESTMENT, SPECULATION,
LEASE, RESALE, OR THE LIKE.
These two points will be subdivided under the following
subheadings or groupings for discussion and argument,
(A) POSSESSION OF THE GROUND.
(B) OCCUPANCY OF THE GROUND.
(C) THE ORDINARY USE OF THE OCCUPANT.
(D) ADVERSE POSSESSION REQUIREMENTS OF APPLICABLE
STATUTES.
(E) PRESUMPTIONS.

POINT III
DOCTRINE O·F TELONIS vs. STALEY SHOULD BE
OVERRULED.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S
ADVERSE POSSESSION.
POINT II
ORDINARY USE OF OCCUPANT MAY COMPREHEND
HOLDING LAND FOR INVESTMENT, SPECULATION,
LEASE, RESALE, OR THE LIKE.
(These two points are consolidated for argument under
the several subheadings as indicated hereafter.)
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(A) POSSESSION OF THE GROUND:

It is patently evident, and not controverted (Rec.
17-19, 45-52) that appellant took possession of the
ground in question under claim of right pursuant to tax
deed (Exhibit ''A"), issued on June 7, 1939, by going
actually, and physically upon the property, shortly after
receiving his deed, clearing up the trash and weeds,
placing ''for rent'' and ''no trespassing'' signs thereon,
and, that he continued such acts, and maintained an
uninterrupted possession right on through and down
to the time of trial, and had had the lot plowed in 1949
fall season. No one interfered with appellant's control
in such manner as to oust or hinder him, although by
the .testimony of respondent and some of his witnesses,
it appeared that they, too, did sometimes go on the
vacant ground in question, but such were only minor
trespasses that might hap~pen in any neighborhood upon
vacant lots.
(B) OCCUPANCY OF THE GROUND :

Having taken possession of the ground, plaintiff is
deemed an occupant. See Twiggs vs. State Board of
Land Commissione·rs, 27 Utah 241, 75 Pacific 729, at
page 731, where the court said:
''Occupancy does not necessarily include residence. Webster defines 'occupancy' as the 'act
of taking or holding possession'; and an 'occupant' as one who· has the actual use or possession,
or is in possession of a thing.' In 2 Ralph. &
Lawrence's Dictionary, 893, we find that in its
usual sense, occupancy is when a person exercises
physical control over the land. ''
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From 1939 on\Yard, no one ousted appellant, no one
brought any suits to enjoin him from performing any act
that he performed on the land, and he continued in actual
uninterrupted possession. There is no evidence of any
person, including respondents, or their predecessors, who
did or performed any act or acts sufficiently inconsistent
with appellant's occupancy during the period 1940-1949,
to gainsay that fact. And, as stated in 1 Jones Commentaries on Evidence (2nd Edition), Page 40:

"Section 268. Possession. - Possession of
either .realty or personalty, once proved, is presumed to continue until the contrary is shown.
Thus it is ~proved at a given time "B" was seized
of land. The presumption is that such seisen
continues, and the burden is on him who alleges
disseisin. ' '
Nothing contained in the transcript of the evidence
shows :anything to indicate appellant's p·ossession was
terminated or ousted.
Furthermore, in the case of 'West End' Brrewing Company vs. !Osborne, 238 N.Y.S. 345, 227 Ap'p. Div. 340, the
Court held, in determining whether or not a tax deed
purchaser had complied with statutory requirements of
serving notice of expiration of redemption period on an
occupant of land, that as no notice· had been given to
an owner maintaining an advertising sign on the ground,
that the statutory requirements had not been met, and
stated:
''Actual possession is the same as pedis poss~essio or pedis positio, and this means a foothold
on the land, an actual entry, and possession in
fact, and standing upon it as a real demonstraSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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tive act done. Churchill vs. Onerdank, 59 N.Y.
134, 136. 'Actual possession is usually evidenced
by occupation * * * * or by appropriate use according to the particular locality and quality of
the property. 48. C. J. 780. The lots were not
vacant [referring to an advertising sign thereon]
. . . . The location was suitable for advertising,
and the plaintiff erected the sign and used and
. maintained it to advertise its product. Although
its name as owner did not appear thereon, nevertheless, its products were advertised. The use
was an appropriate one, according to locality,
and constitutBd actual occupancy . . . . ''
It would seem to follow, that appellant's maintenance of signs would be a further act of occupancy.
Such minor trespasses, and the like, as committed
by respondents, and others, strangers to the land, would
not interrupt the possession and/or occupancy of appellant, for the rule is, as stated in W eyse vs. Biedebach,
a California District Court of Appeal Case, 261 Pac.
Rep. page 1086 (1089) :
''The rule is well established in California,
that the use and occup,ation requisite to a:dverse
possession do not always require (constant' use.
Myers v. Berven, 166 Cal. 484, 137 P. 260. It
is enough that the property be devoted to the
ordinary use of the occupants, and temporary
abandonments or periods of vacancy which evince
no intention of abandonment do not interrupt the
. . . . ."
possession
(C) THE ORDINARY USE OF THE OCCUPANT :

This phrase as used in the Utah Statutes [Sec. 1042-9, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, Sec. 104-12-9, Chapter
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58, LR\YS 1951, Page 182-3] is not further defined therein,
and it is inherent in the wording, that the determinative
use is to be ''fixed'' by the ''occupant'' of the ground,
and, it can readily be seen, that, land can be put to as
great a variety of usages, as the fertile ·brain of mankind can devise. Similarly worded statutes in California
have been liberally interpreted, as shown by the following language from Posey vs. Bay Point Realty Contpany, a California Supreme Court decision, reported in
241 Cal. 708, 7 Pac. 2d, 1020, where the court says :
'' [3, 4] .... If but slight use can be made of
land claimed adversely, then the requirements of
continuous and uninterrupted occupancy are satisfied, if such slight use as can be made is made
thereof. This is the plain meaning of the clause
''for the ordinary use of the occupant''; it means
a use approp.riate to the location and character
of the property, each case resting upon its own
peculiar facts.''
It should furthermore be kept in mind that our
present section .104-2-9, U.C.A. 1943 or section 104-12-9,
Chapter 58, Session Laws 1951, has, in substantially the
same form been on the statute books since before the
compilation of laws of 1876. In the days of its ·original
enactment, the landholdings, and real property questions,
embraced the hon1e, the homestead or farm, timber,
pasture, or agricultural ground. Even so-called "urban"
landholdings of that period commonly included large
enough lots or tracts to permit gardening, maintaining
a cow, and the like. So, in viewing the sections of that
statute, it will be found that all the modes of "usage"
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of the occupant were those p·ertinent to a predominantly
agricultural community life, identified with the times.
Briefly, let us list them:
(1) Cultivating or improving the land,
~

(2) Protecting it by a substantial inclosure,
(3) Where used for obtaining fuel, or fencing
timber for purpose of husbandry, or for pasturage, or the ordinary use of the occupant, while
uninclosed.
(4) Where a known farm lot has been partly improved,. the portion of such farm or lot that may
have been left uncleared or uninclosed according
to usual course and custom of the adjoining county
is deemed to have been occupied for the same
length of time as the parts improved .and ·cultivated.
But, time marches on, and use appropriate in 1876,
while still applicable to rural holdings, have, in urban
areas and centers been superseded by other uses, and
other uses appropriate to the location and ·character of
the property and the present time.
Now, just as the Utah Supreme Court, in Spangler
vs. Corless, 61 Utah 88, 211 Pacific 692, in -construing
the exemption statutes, in the case of the "one horse,
with vehicle and harness or other equipment used by a
physician, surgeon, . . . '' as exempted by the statutes,
to mean, in the light of later times, that when the
horse drawn vehicle was superseded by an automobile,
the latter would likewise come within the purview of
the statutory exemption, so, the Court must now con-
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sider that the transition from a rural to an urban use
area, 'vill introduce into our econon1y other uses and
bases for holding g'round, and, the construction of the
term ''ordinary use of the occupant'', must be made
in a manner befitting' current conditions.
It appears from the evidence (Rec. 35), that appellant has purchased and held property at tax sales; and,
from other cases in this Court, such as Parker vs. Ross,
217 Pac. 2d 373, Pender vs. Bird, 224 Pac. 2d 1057.
Pender vs. Anderson, 235 Pac. 2d 360, that app·ellant
deals in real property and real property interests. It
follows that as a concorqitant principle, that realty is
now, often held, particularly in newly growing or developing areas, or in changing areas, as vacant ground,
rather than for primary agricultural, residential, or the
like use, and not infrequently, as an investment, rental,
or speculative venture.
So, it is urged, that in locations such as this, especially, since it appears that residents of the locality
(Rec. 71) wanted the school board to add it to the school
playground, that it would be a perfectly proper and consistent use of the occupant to hold it for investment,
resale, for rent, to whomever might buy, as one of the
"ordinary uses" permitted to an occupant. The Court
should therefore find that appellant's usage of the
ground, both factually and legally, falls within the scope
of the statutory definition.
(D) ADVERSE POSSESSION REQUIREMENTS OF APPLICABLE
STATUTES:

Considering now, the several factors necessary to
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gain title by adverse possession under a written instrument, it is to be noted:
(a) Appellant went into possession under a tax
deed.
(b) That ap'pellant took actual physical possession of the land and occupied the same.
(c) That the land was used for the ordinary purposes or usage of the occupant-appellant.
(d) That the land was continuously occupied and
claimed for seven years by the appellant
and, that he paid all taxes during such
1940-9 period, as required by the provisions of Section 104-2-8 U.C.A. 1943, or by
Section 104-12-8, Utah Session Laws 1951,
Ch. 58.
It is now elementary law that the validity of the instrument in writing under which appellant entered, is
no barrier to obtaining title by adverse user, even if
such instrument were invalid for any reason. It should
be held that the trial court was in error, in not finding
for .appellant on the issue of adverse possession, and,
that ordinary use of the occupant was maintained in
this instance and under the circumstances detailed herein.
(E) PRESUMPTIONS:

Counsel are not unmindful of the situation
that might be cr~ea ted by the provisions of Section 104-2-7, U.C.A. 1943, or 104-12-7, Ch. 58, Session
Laws, 1951, which in the form therein set forth, or in
the amended further form of Section 104-2-7, Chapter
19, Session Laws, 1951, might be applied to this set of
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facts, based on the th~ory that respondents, for the purposes of suit might be presumed to have established such
title, as would give them a theoretical possession, and
subordinate other titles to theirs. However, a careful
reading of the \vording in the section, and the provisions
thereof, \vill sho\v that no benefit can be squeezed therefrom for respondents.
Previous references to this statute in cases, seem to
have construed it as reading:
'' . . . the person establishing THE LEGAL
TITLE to such property, shall he presumed to
have been possessed, etc.... "
whereas, the statute now and always has read:
'' . • . the person establishing A LEGAL
TITLE, to such property, shall be presumed to
have been possessed, etc. . .. ''
Now, it must be conceded, from the following authorities,
that a legal title may be based on a tax title, a title by
adverse possession, by record title, and so forth:
'' [3] As we have previously stated, appellee
based his right to redeem on his tax title which
was entirely disconnected from his judgment lien.
Certainly, a tax title, which is prima facie valid,
is a 'legal title', which authorizes the holder
thereof to redeem real estate.'' -Murray vs.
Holland, Indiana, 27 N.E. 2nd, 126.
"[1] ... It is true that, in an action under
this statute to quiet title, the plaintiff must have·
both title and p~ossession, but this does not mean
that he must have paper title to the land. It only
means that he must be ·claiming the land under
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such a title as would give him the right to possession of it, and this character of title may rest
on adverse possession .... '' -Turner vs. Bowens,
Ky. 203 S.W. 749.
'' [3] The title acquired by limitations is a
"
legal title, and not an equitable title, .
-Houston ·Oil Company vs. Ainsworth, Texas,
192 s.w. 614.
"[17] The term "legal title" has no absolute
or strict meaning . . . . It is not necessarily the
record title for legal title may be acquired by
possession.'' -Barnes v. Boyd, 8 Fed. Sup. 584.
Applying the terms of the statute to our facts: If
it is argued that respondents have any benefit from
such statute hy virtue of the presumption, then, it may
be answered that appellant likewise has the benefits
of the presumptions, since he has a legal title under
and by virtue of his tax deed. If nothing more appeared, there might be a stalemate over the effects of
such presumptions. See the parallel set out as situation (2), 1 Jones Commentaries on Evidence, 2nd Edition, at page 610, Section 357 on Conflicts, Relative
Weights and Presumptions on Presumption. But, as
between the two legal title holders, appellant was the
one who brought the suit, not the respondent, and appellant's evidence showed him to be the more aggre~
sive actor respecting the ground, as he had it 'plowed,
had weeded it, put up signs, occupied, and paid the
taxes on it, and by analogy to the situation (2) di8cussed in Jones on Evidence, appellant by "introducing
some other testimony to meet his burden of proof",
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has overcome any benefit of the presun1ption that might
be claimed for respondents, 'vho 'vould likewise lose any
presumption in their favor by reason of the provision
of the same statute which says, following the mention
of the presumption, "unless it appears that the property has been held and possessed adversely to such
legal title for seven years before the commencement of
the action.'' which is truly the case here as above set out.
POINT III
DOCTRINE OF TELONIS vs. STALEY SHOULD BE
OVERRULED.

Telonis vs. St·aley, 104 Utah 537, 144 Pac. 2nd 513,
enunciated the principal that absence of the auditor's
affidavits from assessment rolls would invalidate the
tax sale procedure based on sales for years with no affidavits on the rolls. This doctrine was bottomed on the
theory that (1) No remedial legislation to relieve from
this failure had ever been enacted, and (2) That the
necessity of protecting the taxpayer in relying on the
rolls, required affixation of the affidavits.
Permit us to say, in passing, that it is not our
intent to burden the Court herein at this junction with
repetition of the arguments in favor of the contrary
view, as so ably and fully expressed in Telonis v. Staley,
in former opinion in 106 Pac. 2d 163, 99 Utah 336, and
the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Larson beginning
at page 519 of 144 Pacific 2nd 513, as members of the
court are as fully cognizant of them as are counsel,
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but to point out that in addition to all the arguments
expressed in those opinions, that our legislature by the
successive acts of amendment to our statutes of limitation relating to tax sales, Sections 104-2-5.10 and related
sections of Chapter 19, Laws of Utah, 1943 (since declared
unconstitutional) and in Sections 104-2-5 to 104-2.5.11,
Chapter 19, Session Laws Utah, 1951, has been in effect,
trying or making those remedial acts or curative acts,
without which the court has previously held, such affidavits of the auditor were indispensible requisites. Furthermore, it seems most anomolous to say that such
affidavits are a necessity for the protection of the taxpayer and his rights, and for his reliance, in order to
set aside tax sales, and still, not to pursue the logical
sequence of such reasoning to hold the lack of such affidavits make the procedure of the taxing unit absolutely
void; yet, as in Steele vs. San Luis Obispo, 152 Cal. 785,
93 Pac. 1020, the taxpayer was denied recovery of taxes
in proceedings against the taxing unit.
For these and other reasons, it is respectfully urged
that the court reconsider its former holding, and, announce
that it will no longer sustain attacks on tax deeds, based
on such alleged defects as lack of auditor's affidavits on
the assessment rolls, since it is apparent that the real
and only purpose of such affidavits is to authenticate the
tax r·olls in such wise as to obviate proof by witnesses
other than the rolls themselves of their correctness, and,
to give the treasurer a basis for proceeding to collect
the taxes listed therein-for surely the paramount doctrine of protection of the public revenue, and sustaining
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the acts of its taxing officials, when they did perform
their duties in accordance with law, and in such manner,
as not to cause any real prejudice to any taxpayer,
especially where it cannot be shown that any exception
to the lack of such affidavits 'Yas taken at the time or
year of assessment to halt in the beginning the evil complained about, should prevail.

CONCLUSION
IT WAS ERROR, on the part of the trial court to
deny the plaintiff-appellant his right to have his
title to the premises in question quieted, and, to hold
that he was not holding such premises adversely to the
respondents, and, that his tax title was invalid.
WHEREFORE, the plaintiff and appellant prays
this Honorable Court to reverse the holding of the trial
court, and to remand the same for further proceedings
in accordance with the principles set forth herein, or
for the Supreme Court to find for appellant, and order
recasting of the findings, conclusions, and decree directly.
Respectfully submitted,
MLIT·ON V. BACKMAN of
BACKMAN, BACKMAN & CLARK
and
R. S. JOHNSON
Attorneys for Plaintiff
and Appellant.
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